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biased predictor of volatility, which often encom-
passes other forecasts. 
Readers who are already familiar with the
basics of options might wish to skip the first sec-
tion of this article; it explains how option prices
are determined by the cost of a portfolio of assets
that can be dynamically traded to provide the
option payoff. Readers who are unfamiliar with
options might wish to start with the glossary of
option terms at the end of this article and the insert
on the basics of options (boxed insert 1). The sec-
ond section reviews the relation between IV and
future volatility, showing how option pricing
formulas can be “inverted” to estimate volatility.
The third section measures the IV of short-term
interest rates over time and discusses how such
measures can aid in interpreting economic events. 
HOW DOES ONE PRICE
OPTIONS?
Options are a derivative asset. That is, option
payoffs depend on the price of the underlying
asset. Because of this, one can often exactly
replicate the payoff to an option with a suitably
E
conomists often use asset prices along
with models of their determination to
derive financial markets’ expectations
of events. For example, monetary econ-
omists use federal funds futures prices to meas-
ure expectations of interest rates (Krueger and
Kuttner, 1995; Pakko and Wheelock, 1996).
Similarly, a large literature on fixed and target
zone exchange rates has used forward exchange
rates to measure the credibility of exchange rate
regimes or to predict their collapse (Svensson,
1991; Rose and Svensson, 1991, 1993; Neely,
1994).
But it is often helpful to gauge the uncertainty
associated with future asset prices as well as their
expectation. Because option prices depend on
the perceived volatility of the underlying asset,
they can be used to quantify the expected volatil-
ity of an asset price (Latane and Rendleman, 1976).
Such estimates of volatility, called implied volatil-
ity (IV), require some heroic assumptions about
the stochastic (random) process governing the
underlying asset price. But the usual assumptions
seem to provide very reasonable forecasts of
volatility. That is, IV is a highly significant but
Option prices can be used to infer the level of uncertainty about future asset prices. The first two
parts of this article explain such measures (implied volatility) and how they can differ from the
market’s true expectation of uncertainty. The third then estimates the implied volatility of three-
month eurodollar interest rates from 1985 to 2001 and evaluates its ability to predict realized
volatility. Implied volatility shows that uncertainty about short-term interest rates has been falling
for almost 20 years, as the levels of interest rates and inflation have fallen. And changes in implied
volatility are usually coincident with major news about the stock market, the real economy, and
monetary policy.
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BOXED INSERT 1: OPTION BASICS
A call is an option to buy an underlying asset; a put is an option to sell the underlying asset. A
European option can be exercised only at the end of its life; an American option can be exercised at
any time prior to expiry. 
One can either buy or sell options. In other words, one can be long or short in call options or long
or short in put options. The payoff to a long position in a European call option with a strike price of
X is max(ST – X, 0). The payoff to a long position in a European put option with a strike price of X is
max(X – ST, 0). The payoffs to short positions are the negatives of these. The figure below shows the
payoffs to the four option positions as a function of the terminal asset price for strike prices of $40.
The relation of the current price of the underlying asset to the strike price of an option defines
the option’s “moneyness.” Options that would net a profit if they could be exercised immediately are
said to be “in the money.” Options that would lose money if they were exercised immediately are
“out of the money,” and those that would just break even are “at the money.” For example, if the
underlying asset price is $50, then a call option with a strike price of $40 is in the money, while a
put option with the same strike would be out of the money.
Because the holder of an option has limited risk from adverse price movements, greater asset
price volatility tends to raise the price of an option. Because the uncertainty about the future asset
price generally increases with time to expiry, options generally have “time value,” meaning that—
all else equal—American options with greater time to expiry will be worth more.1
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riskless asset. The set of assets that replicates the
option payoff is called the replicating portfolio.
This section explains how arbitrage equalizes the
price of the option and the price of the replicating
portfolio.
Pricing an Option with a Binomial Tree
A simple numerical example will help explain
how the price of an option is equal to the price of
a portfolio of assets that can replicate the option
payoff. Suppose that a stock price is currently $10
and that it will either be $12 or $8 in one year.1
Suppose further that interest rates are currently
5 percent. A one-year European call option with
a strike price of $10 gives the buyer the right, but
not the obligation, to purchase the stock for $10
at the end of one year.2 If the stock price goes up
to $12, the option will be worth $2 because it con-
fers the right to pay $10 for an asset with a $12
market price. But if the stock price falls to $8, the
option will be worthless because no one would
want to buy a stock at the strike price when the
market price is lower. 
Suppose that the First Bank of Des Peres
(FBDP) sells one call option on one share of a non-
dividend-paying stock and simultaneously buys
some amount, call it ∆, shares of the stock. If the
stock price goes up to $12, the FBDP’s portfolio
will be worth the value of its stock, less the value
of the option: $12∆ – $2. If the stock price falls to
$8, the option will be worthless and the FBDP’s
portfolio will only be worth $8∆. The key to option
pricing is that the FBDP can choose ∆ to make the
value of its portfolio the same in either state of
the world: It chooses ∆ = 1/2, to make $12∆ – $2 =
$8∆ – $0. That is, if the FBDP buys ∆ = 1/2 units
of the stock after selling the call option, it will
have a riskless payoff to its portfolio of $4.
Because this payoff is riskless, the portfolio
of a short call option and 1/2 share of the stock
must earn the riskless return. If it did not, there
would be an arbitrage opportunity. The initial
cost of the portfolio is the cost of the ∆ shares of
stock ($10∆) less the price of the call option ($C).
The initial cost of the portfolio must equal its
discounted riskless payoff ($4e–0.05): 
(1) .3
Using the fact that ∆ = 1/2, the price of the call
option must be 
(2)               .
If the price of the call option were more than
$1.1951, one could make a riskless profit by sell-
ing the option and holding 1/2 shares of the stock.4
If the call option price were less than $1.1951, one
could make an arbitrage profit by buying the call
and shorting 1/2 shares of the stock. 
An equivalent way to look at the problem is
to create the portfolio that replicates the initial
investment/payoff of the call option. That is, the
FBDP could borrow $5 and buy 1/2 of a share of
the stock. At the end of the year, the 1/2 share of
stock would be worth either $6 or $4 and the
FBDP would owe ($5e0.05=) $5.2564 on the money
it borrowed. The initial investment would be zero
and the payoff would be $0.7436 in the first state
and –$1.2564 in the second state. This is the same
initial investment/payoff structure as borrowing
$1.1951 and buying the call option with a strike
price of $10. In other words, the portfolio that
replicates the call option in this example is a 1/2
share of the stock and an equal short position in
a riskless bond. 
Introductory textbooks on derivatives, like
Hull (2002), Jarrow and Turnbull (2000), or
Dubofsky and Miller (2003), provide a much more
Ce =− = − $$ $ . . 10
1
2
4 1 1951 00 5
$$ . 10 4 0 05 ∆− = − Ce
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1 This example assumes that the stock pays no dividends. If it did
pay known dividends, it could be priced in a similar way. 
2 A European option confers the right to buy or sell the underlying
asset for a given price at the expiry of the option. An American
option can be exercised on or before the expiry date. A call (put)
option confers the right, but not the obligation, to buy (sell) a par-
ticular asset at a given price, called the strike price.
3 If the continuously compounded interest rate is 5 percent, the
price of a riskless bond with a one-year payoff of $4 would have a
price of $4e–0.05.
4 Suppose that the call option cost $1.30. One would sell the call
option, borrow $3.70, and use the proceeds of the option sale and
the borrowed funds to buy 1/2 share of stock. If the first state of the
world occurs, the writer of the option will have $6 in stock but will
pay $2 to the option buyer and (3.70e0.05 =) $3.89 to the bank that
loaned him the funds originally. He will make a riskless profit of
$0.11. Similarly, in the second state of the world, the option expires
worthless and the option writer sells the 1/2 share of stock for $4,
pays the loan off with $3.89 and again makes $0.11 riskless profit. 
 extensive treatment of binomial trees as well as
information about how options pricing formulas
change for different types of assets. 
Black-Scholes Valuation
The preceding example, illustrated in Figure 1,
was a one-step binomial tree. The option price
was calculated under the assumption that the
stock could take one of two known values at
expiry. Suppose instead that the stock could move
up or down several times before expiration. In
this case, one can calculate an option price by
computing each possible value of the option at
expiry and working backward to get the price at
the beginning of the tree. As the asset prices rise
and the call option goes “into the money,” the
replicating portfolio holds more of the underlying
asset and less of the riskless bond.5 At each point
in time, the option writer chooses the position in
the underlying asset to maintain a riskless payoff
to the hedged portfolio—the combination of the
positions in the option, the underlying asset, and
the riskless bond. The position in the underlying
asset is equal to the rate of change in the option
value with respect to the underlying asset price.
This rate of change is known as the option’s
“delta” and the continuous process of adjustment
of the underlying asset position is known as “delta
hedging.” The limit of the formula for an option
price from an n-step binomial tree, as n goes to
infinity, is the Black-Scholes (BS) formula (Black
and Scholes, 1972).6
The BS formula expresses the value of a
European call or put option as a function of the
underlying asset price (S), the strike price (X), the
interest rate (r), time to expiry (T), and the variance
of the underlying asset return (σ2). Higher asset
price volatility means higher option prices because
the downside risk is always limited, whereas the
upside potential is not. Therefore, option prices
increase with expected volatility. The formula for
the price of a European call option on a spot asset
that pays no dividends or interest is the following: 
(3)                  ,
where and 
and N(*) is the cumulative normal density func-
tion. Hull (2002), Jarrow and Turnbull (2000), and
Dubofsky and Miller (2003) provide formulas for
put options and options on other types of assets. 
The BS formula strictly applies to European
options only—not to American options, which
can be exercised any time prior to expiry—and it
requires modifications for assets that pay divi-
dends, such as stocks, or that don’t require an
initial outlay, such as futures.7 Further, the BS
model makes some strong assumptions: that the
underlying asset price follows a lognormal random
walk, that the riskless rate is a known function
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Figure 1
Pricing a Call Option with a Binomial Tree
NOTE: The figure illustrates values that a hypothetical stock
could take, along with the value of a call option on that stock
with a strike price of $10.
Stock Price = $12
Option Value = $2
Stock Price = $8
Option Value = $0
Stock Price = $10
Option Price = ?
5 A call (put) option is said to be “in the money” if the underlying
asset price is greater (less) than the strike price. If the underlying
asset price is less (greater) than the strike price, the call (put) option
is “out of the money.” When the underlying asset price is near (at)
the strike price, the option is “near (at) the money.” 
6 There are several ways to derive the BS formula that differ in their
required assumptions (Merton, 1973b). Wilmott, Howison, and
Dewynne (1995) provide a nice introduction to the mathematics
of the BS formula and Wilmott (2000) extends that treatment to
cover the price of volatility risk. Boyle and Boyle (2001) discuss
the history of option pricing formulas. 
7 Black (1976) provides the formula for options on futures, rather
than spot assets. Barone-Adesi and Whaley (1987) provide an
approximation to the BS formula that accounts for early exercise. position in the underlying asset (delta hedging),
and that there are no transactions costs on the
underlying asset and no arbitrage opportunities.
Despite these strong assumptions, the BS model is
very widely used by practitioners and academics,
often fitting the data reasonably well even when
its assumptions are clearly violated.
Does IV Predict Realized Volatility?
The BS model expresses the price of a
European call or put option (C or P) as a function
of five arguments {S, X, r, T, and σ2}. Of those six
quantities, five are observable as market prices or
features of the option contract {C, S, X, r, T}. The
BS formula is frequently inverted to solve for the
sixth quantity, the IV {σ} of log asset returns in
terms of the observed quantities. This IV is used to
predict the volatility of the asset return to expiry. 
Ironically, the BS formula usually used to
derive IV assumes that volatility is constant. Hull
and White (1987) provide the foundation for the
practice of using a constant-volatility model to
predict stochastic volatility (SV): If volatility
evolves independently of the underlying asset
price and no priced risk is associated with the
option, the correct price of a European option
equals the expectation of the BS formula, evalu-
ating the variance argument at average variance
until expiry:
(4) ,
where the average variance until expiry is
denoted as 
and its square root is usually referred to as realized
volatility (RV).8
Bates (1996) points out that the expectation
in (4) is taken with respect to variance until expiry,
not standard deviation until expiry. Therefore,
one cannot use the linearity of the BS formula

























ing the expectation through the BS formula. That
is, one cannot claim that the correct price of a call
option under stochastic volatility is the BS price
evaluated at the expected value of the standard
deviation until expiry. That is, it is not true that 
(5) .
Instead, Bates (1996) approximates the relation
between the BS IV and expected variance until
expiry with a Taylor series expansion of the BS
price for an at-the-money option. That is, for at-
the-money options, the BS formula for futures
reduces to 
.
This can be approximated with a second-order
Taylor expansion of N(*) around zero, which
yields 
.
Another second-order Taylor expansion of that
approximation around the expected value of
variance until expiry shows that the BS IV is
approximately the expected variance until expiry:
(6) .
That is, the BS-implied variance (σBS
2 ) understates
the expected variance of the asset until expiry
(EtV
–
t,T). Similarly, BS-implied standard deviation
(σBS) slightly understates the expected standard
deviation of asset returns.9
The Volatility Smile
Volatility is constant in the BS model; IV does
not vary with the “moneyness” of the option.
That is, if the BS model assumptions were literally
true, the IV from a deep-in-the-money call should
be the same as that from an at-the-money call or
an in-the-money put. In reality, for most assets, IV
does vary with moneyness. A graph of IV versus
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8 Romano and Touzi (1997) extend the Hull and White (1987) result
to include models that permit arbitrary correlation between returns
and volatility, like the Heston (1993) model.
9 Note that (6) depends on (4), which assumes that there is no priced
risk associated with holding the option. That is, (6) requires that
changes in volatility do not create priced risk for an option writer. smile” or “volatility smirk,” depending on the
shape of the relation. Research attributes the
volatility smile to deviations from the BS assump-
tions about the evolution of the underlying asset
prices, such as the presence of stochastic volatility,
jumps in the price of the underlying asset, and
jumps in volatility (Bates, 1996, 2003).
The existence of the volatility smile brings up
the question of which strike prices—or combina-
tions of strike prices—to use to compute IV. In
practice, IV is usually computed from a few near-
the-money options for three reasons (Bates, 1996):
(i) The BS formula is most sensitive to IV for at-
the-money options. (ii) Near-the-money options
are usually the most heavily traded, resulting in
smaller pricing errors. (iii) Beckers (1981) showed
that IV from at-the-money options provides the
best estimates of future realized volatility. While
researchers have varied the number and types of
options as well as the weighting procedure, it has
been common to rely heavily on a few at-the-
money options. 
Constructing IV from Options Data
At each date, IV is chosen to minimize the
unweighted sum of squared deviations of Barone-
Adesi and Whaley’s (1987) formula for pricing
American options on futures with the actual settle-
ment prices for the two nearest-to-the-money call
options and two nearest-to-the-money put options
for the appropriate futures contract.10 That is, IV
is computed as follows:
(7) ,
where Pri,t is the observed settlement premium
(price) of the ith option on day t and BAWi(*) is
the appropriate call or put formula as a function
of the IV.
Before being used in the minimization of (7),
the data were checked to make sure that they
obeyed the inequality restrictions implied by the
no-arbitrage conditions on American options
prices: C $ F – X and P $ X – F, where F is the
σσ σ IV t T i
i
tT it tT BAW Pr ,, , , argmin ( ( ) )




price of the underlying futures contract. These
conditions apply because an American option—
which can be exercised at any time—must always
be worth at least its value if exercised immediately.
Options prices that did not obey these relations
were discarded. In addition, the observation was
discarded if there was not at least one call and
one put price.
THE PROPERTIES OF IMPLIED
VOLATILITY
How Well Does IV Predict RV?
Equation (6) says that BS IV is approximately
the conditional expectation of RV(V
–
t,T). This
relation has two testable implications: IV should
be an unbiased predictor of RV; no other forecast
should improve the forecast from IV. If IV is an
unbiased predictor of RV, one should find that
{α, β1} = {0, 1} in the following regression:
(8) ,
where σRV,t,T denotes the RV of the asset return
from time t to T and σIV,t,T is IV at t for an option
expiring at T.11 RV is the annualized standard
deviation of asset returns from t to T: 
(9) ,
where Ft is the asset price at t and there are 250
business days in the year.
The other commonly investigated hypothesis
about IV is that no other forecast improves its fore-
casts of RV. If IV does subsume other information
in this way, it is said to be an “informationally
efficient predictor” of volatility. Researchers
investigate this issue with variants of the following
encompassing regression:
(10) , σα β σ β σε R VtT I VtT F VtT t , , ,, ,, =+ + + 12
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10 The results in this paper are almost indistinguishable when done
with European option pricing formulas (Black, 1976) or the Barone-
Adesi and Whaley correction for American options. 
11 Researchers also estimate (8) with realized and implicit variances,
rather than standard deviations. The results from such estimations
provide similar inference to those done with variances. Other
authors argue that because volatility is significantly skewed, one
should estimate (8) with log volatility. Equation (6) shows that
use of logs introduces another source of bias into the theoretical
relation between RV and IV. where σFV,t,T is some alternative forecast of volatil-
ity from t to T.12 If one rejects that β2 = 0 for some
σFV,t,T, then one rejects that IV is informationally
efficient.
Across many asset classes and sample periods,
researchers estimating versions of (8) have found
that α ˆ is positive and β ˆ
1 is less than 1 (Canina and
Figlewski, 1993; Lamoureux and Lastrapes, 1993;
Jorion, 1995; Fleming, 1998; Christensen and
Prabhala, 1998; Szakmary et al., 2003). That is, IV
is a significantly biased predictor of RV: A given
change in IV is associated with a larger change
in RV. 
Tests of informational efficiency provide more
mixed results. Kroner, Kneafsey, and Claessens
(1993) concluded that combining time-series
information with IV could produce better fore-
casts than either technique singly. Blair, Poon, and
Taylor (2001) discover that historical volatility
provides no incremental information to forecasts
from VIX IVs.13 Li (2002) and Martens and Zein
(2004) find that intraday data and long-memory
models can improve on IV forecasts of RV in cur-
rency markets.
It is understandable that tests of informational
efficiency provide more varied results than do
tests of unbiasedness. Because theory does not
restrict what sort of information could be tested
against IV, the former tests suffer a data snooping
problem. Even if IV is informationally efficient,
some other forecasts will improve its predictions
in a given sample, purely as a result of sampling
variation. These forecasts will not add informa-
tion to IV in other periods, however. 
But some authors have found reasonably
strong evidence against the simple informational
efficiency hypothesis across assets and classes of
forecasts (Neely, 2004a,b). This casts doubt on the
data snooping explanation. It seems likely that
IV is not informationally efficient by statistical
criteria and that the failure of unbiasedness and
inefficiency are related. 
Several hypotheses have been put forward to
explain the conditional bias: errors in IV estima-
tion, sample selection bias, estimation with over-
lapping observations, and poor measurement of
RV. Perhaps the most popular solution to the
conditional bias puzzle is the claim that volatil-
ity risk is priced. This theory requires some
explanation.
The Price of Volatility Risk
To understand the volatility risk problem,
consider that there are two sources of uncertainty
for an option writer—the agent who sells the
option—if the volatility of the underlying asset
can change over time: the change in the price of
the underlying asset and the change in its volatil-
ity.14 An option writer would have to take a posi-
tion both in the underlying asset (delta hedging)
and in another option (vega hedging) to hedge
both sources of risk.15 If the investor only hedges
with the underlying asset—not using another
option too—then the return to the investor’s port-
folio is not certain. It depends on changes in
volatility. If such volatility fluctuations represent
a systematic risk, then investors must be compen-
sated for exposure to them. In this case, the Hull-
White result (4) does not apply because there will
be risk associated with holding the option and
the IV from the BS formula will not approximate
the conditional expectation of objective variance
as in (6).
The idea that volatility risk might be priced
has been discussed for some time: Hull and White
(1987) and Heston (1993) consider it. Lamoureux
and Lastrapes (1993) argued that the price of
volatility risk was likely to be responsible for the
bias in IVs options on individual stocks. But most
empirical work has assumed that this volatility
risk premium is zero, that volatility risk could be
hedged or is not priced. 
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12 One need not make the econometric forecast orthogonal to IV before
using it in (10). The β ˆ
2 t-statistic provides the same asymptotic
inference as the appropriate F-test for the null that β2 = 0. And the
F-test is invariant to orthogonalizing the regressors because it is
based on the regression R2.
13 VIX is a weighted index of IVs calculated from near-the-money,
short-term, S&P 100 options. It is designed to correct measurement
problems associated with the volatility smile and early exercise.
14 A more general model would imply additional sources of risk
such as discontinuities (jumps) in the underlying asset price or
underlying volatility. 
15 Delta and vega denote the partial derivatives of the option price
with respect to the underlying asset price and its volatility,
respectively. Is it reasonable to assume that the volatility
risk premium is zero? There is no question that
volatility is stochastic, options prices depend on
volatility, and risk is ubiquitous in financial
markets. And if customers desire a net long posi-
tion in options to hedge against real exposure or
to speculate, some agents must hold a net short
position in options. Those agents will be exposed
to volatility fluctuations. If that risk is priced in
the asset pricing model, those agents must be com-
pensated for exposure to that risk. These facts
argue that a non-zero price of volatility risk creates
IV’s bias.
On the other hand, there seems little reason
to think that volatility risk itself should be priced.
While the volatility of the market portfolio is a
priced factor in the intertemporal capital asset
pricing model (CAPM) (Merton, 1973a; Campbell,
1993), it is more difficult to see why volatility
risk in other markets—e.g., foreign exchange and
commodity markets—should be priced. One must
appeal to limits-of-arbitrage arguments (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1997) to justify a non-zero price of
currency volatility risk.
Recently, researchers have paid greater atten-
tion to the role of volatility risk in options and
equity markets (Poteshman, 2000; Bates, 2000;
Benzoni, 2002; Chernov, 2002; Pan, 2002;
Bollerslev and Zhou, 2003; and Ang et al., 2003).
Poteshman (2000), for example, directly estimated
the price of risk function and instantaneous vari-
ance from options data, then constructed a meas-
ure of IV until expiry from the estimated volatility
process to forecast SPX volatility over the same
horizon. Benzoni (2002) finds evidence that vari-
ance risk is priced in the S&P 500 option market.
Using different methods, Chernov (2002) also
marshals evidence to support this price of volatil-
ity risk thesis. Neely (2004a,b) finds that Chernov’s
price-of-risk procedures do not explain the bias
in foreign exchange and gold markets. 
THE IMPLIED VOLATILITY OF
SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES
The IV of options on short-term interest rates
illustrates how IV might be applied to understand
economic forces. Central banks are particularly
concerned with short-term interest rates because
most central banks implement monetary policy
by targeting those rates.16 Financial market par-
ticipants and businesses likewise often carefully
follow the actions and announcements of central
banks to better understand the future path of
short-term interest rates. 
Eurodollar Futures Contracts
Interest rate futures are derivative assets
whose payoffs depend on interest rates on some
date or dates in the future. They enable financial
market participants to either hedge their expo-
sure to interest rate fluctuations, or speculate on
interest rate changes. One such instrument is the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange futures contract
for a three-month eurodollar time deposit with a
principal amount of $1,000,000. The final settle-
ment price of this contract is 100 less the British
Bankers’ Association (BBA) three-month euro-
dollar rate prevailing on the second London
business day immediately preceding the third
Wednesday of the contract month: 
(11) ,
where FT is the final settlement price of the futures
contract and RT is the BBA three-month rate on
the contract expiry date. The relation between
the three-month eurodollar rate at expiry and the
final settlement price ties the futures price at all
dates to expectations of this interest rate. 
For concreteness, consider what would hap-
pen if the First Bank of Des Peres (FBDP) sold a
three-month eurodollar futures contract for a
quoted price of $97 on June 7, 2004, for a contract
expiring on September 13, 2004. Banks might
take such short positions to hedge interest rate
fluctuations; they borrow short-term and lend
long-term and will generally lose (gain) when
short-term interest rates rise (fall). The FBDP’s
FR TT == 100
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16 The fact that central banks implement policy by targeting short-
term interest rates does not mean that nominal interest rates can
be interpreted as measuring the stance of monetary policy. For
example, if inflation rises and interest rates remain constant, policy
passively becomes more accommodative, all else equal. short position means that it has effectively agreed
to borrow $1,000,000 for three months, starting
on September 13, 2004, at an interest rate of
(100 – 97 =) 3 percent.
If the market had expected no change in
interest rates through September and risk premia
in this market are constant, then realized changes
in spot interest rates will translate directly into
changes in futures prices.17 If interest rates unex-
pectedly rise 45 basis points between June 7, 2004,
and September 13, 2004, the FBDP futures prices
will fall and the FBDP will have gained by pre-
committing to borrow at 3 percent. If interest rates
unexpectedly decline, however, the FBDP will
lose on the futures contract. 
How much will the FBDP gain (lose) for each
basis-point decrease (increase) in interest rates?
With quarterly compounding it will gain 1 basis
point of interest for one quarter of a year on
$1,000,000. This translates to $25 per basis point. 
(12) .
If the BBA three-month eurodollar rate is 3.45
percent on the day of final settlement, the final
settlement price of the futures contract will be
100 – 3.45 = 96.55 percent. The FBDP will gain
$25 × 45 = $1,125 because it shorted the contract
at $97 and the contract price fell to $96.55 at
final settlement.18 Such a gain would be used to
offset losses from the reduced value of its asset
portfolio (loans). 
Because the final futures price will be deter-
mined by the BBA three-month eurodollar rate
at final settlement, the futures price can be used
to infer the expected future interest rate if there
is no risk premium associated with holding the
futures contract. Or, if there are stable risk premia
associated with holding the contract, one can still
measure changes in expected interest rates from








Splicing the Futures and Options Data
To examine the behavior of IV on short-term
interest rates, we consider settlement data on
each three-month eurodollar futures and option
contract for the period March 20, 1985, through
June 29, 2001. Because exchange-traded futures
and options contracts expire on only a few dates
a year, one cannot obtain a series of options priced
with a fixed expiry horizon for each business day
of the year.19 To obtain as much information as
possible, the usual practice in dealing with futures
and options data is to “splice” data from different
contracts at the beginning of some set of contract
expiry months, usually monthly or quarterly. This
article uses data from futures and options con-
tracts expiring in March, June, September, and
December. For example, settlement prices for the
futures contract and the two nearest-the-money
call and put options expiring in March 1986 are
collected for all trading days in December 1985
and January and February 1986. Then data per-
taining to June 1986 contracts are collected from
March, April, and May 1986 trading dates. A
similar procedure is followed for the September
and December contracts. Such a procedure avoids
pricing problems near final settlement that
result from illiquidity (Johnston, Kracaw, and
McConnell, 1991). This method collects data on
a total of 4,040 business days, with 8 to 76 business
days to option expiry. 
Summary Statistics
Table 1 shows the summary statistics on log
futures price changes in percentage terms, absolute
log futures price changes in annual terms, and
IV and RV in annual terms. Futures price changes
are very close to mean-zero and have some modest
positive autocorrelation. The absolute changes
are definitely positively autocorrelated, as one
would expect from high-frequency asset price
data. IV and RV until expiry have similar mean
and autocorrelation properties. But IV is some-
what less volatile than RV, as one would expect
if IV predicts RV. The mean of RV is slightly lower
Neely
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17 More generally, only unanticipated changes in interest rates will
result in changes in futures prices and risk premia will play some
role in futures returns. 
18 This example assumes the FBDP holds the position until final
settlement. 
19 Additional expiry months were introduced in 1995; previously,
there were four expiry months per year.than that of IV, indicating that there might be a
volatility premium.
Figure 2 clearly illustrates the right skew-
ness in the distribution of IV and changes in IV.
Although it is difficult to see in the lower panel
of Figure 2, very large positive changes in IV are
much more common than very large negative
changes in IV. The fact that IV must be positive
probably partly explains the right skewness in
these distributions. 
Eurodollar Rates and the Federal Funds
Target Rate
The futures and options data considered here
pertain to three-month eurodollar rates. The Fed,
however, is more concerned about the federal
funds rate, the overnight interbank interest rate
used to implement monetary policy, than about
other short-term interest rates, such as the euro-
dollar rate.20 This is because the federal funds
futures prices are often interpreted to provide
market expectations of the Fed’s near-term policy
actions. Short-term interest rates are closely tied
together, however, so there might be information
about the federal funds rate in three-month euro-
dollar futures. 
Figure 3 shows that, although the three-month
eurodollar is much more variable than the federal
funds target over a period of a few days, the two
series closely tracked each other over periods
longer than a few days from March 1985 through
June 2001. One can assume that the expected path
of the funds rate is closely related to the expected
path of the three-month eurodollar rate.21 And
therefore the IV on three-month eurodollars prob-
ably tracks the uncertainty about the federal funds
target over horizons greater than a few days.
Options on Eurodollar Rates
Because option prices depend on the volatil-
ity of the underlying asset (among other factors),
one can measure the uncertainty associated with
expectations of future interest rates from IV from
option prices on eurodollar futures contracts. And
Neely
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Table 1
Summary Statistics
100 · ln(F(t)/F(t–1)) 249 · 100 · |ln(F(t)/F(t–1))| σIV,t,T σRV,t,T
Total observations 4,040 4,040 4,040 4,040
Nobs 3,975 3,975 3,953 4,039
µ 0.003 10.088 0.953 0.769
σ 0.070 14.141 0.458 0.494
Max 1.272 316.645 3.601 3.861
Min –0.449 0.000 0.251 0.076
ρ1 0.070 0.213 0.986 0.989
ρ2 0.023 0.241 0.973 0.977
ρ3 –0.014 0.226 0.960 0.965
ρ4 –0.025 0.246 0.948 0.954
ρ5 –0.007 0.247 0.936 0.942
NOTE: The table contains summary statistics on log futures price changes (percent), annualized absolute log futures price changes, and
annualized IV and RV until expiry. The rows show the total number of observations in the sample, the non-missing observations, the mean,
the standard deviation, the maximum, the minimum, and the first five autocorrelations. The standard error of the autocorrelations is
about 1/√T ≈ 0.016.
21 The payoff to the federal funds futures contract depends on the
average federal funds rate over the course of a month, whereas
the three-month eurodollar futures contract payoff depends on the
BBA quote for the three-month eurodollar rate at one point in time,
the expiry of the contract. 
20 Carlson, Melick, and Sahinoz (2003) describe the recently devel-
oped options market on federal funds futures contracts. the volatility of interest rates will be very close
to the volatility of futures prices because of the
linear relation between the two series at final
settlement: 100 – FT = RT. 
The usual BS measure of IV is a risk-neutral
measure, meaning that it assumes that all risk
associated with holding the option can be arbi-
traged away.22 This is probably not exactly true.
And the eurodollars futures prices don’t neces-
sarily follow the assumptions of the BS model. In
particular, the underlying asset price is probably
subject to jumps. Yet Figure 4, which shows the
IV and RV until expiry of the three-month euro-
dollars futures price, appears to show that the
BS IV tracks RV fairly well. So, one might think
that IV from options on three-month eurodollar
rates measures the uncertainty about future
interest rates reasonably well. 
How Well Does IV Predict RV for
Eurodollar Futures?
One can test the unbiasedness hypothesis—
that IV is an unbiased predictor of RV—with the
predictive regression (8):
(8) . σα β σ ε R VtT I VtT t , ,, , =+ + 1
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Figure 2
The Distributions of Implied Volatility and Changes in Implied Volatility
NOTE: The figure shows the empirical distributions of IV and changes in IV on three-month eurodollar futures prices.
22 Boxed insert 2 explains the concept of risk-neutral measures. Neely
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BOXED INSERT 2: RISK-NEUTRAL VALUATION
The calculation of the price of the option in Figure 1 did not include any assumptions about the
probabilities that the stock price would rise or fall. But the assumptions used to value the stock do
imply “risk-neutral probabilities” of the two states of the world. These are the probabilities that
equate the expected payoff on the stock with the payoff to a riskless asset that requires the same
initial investment. Recall that the stock in the example in Figure 1 was worth $12 in the first state
of the world and $8 in the second state of the world. If the initial price of the stock is $10, the risk-
neutral probabilities solve the following: 
(b1) .
This implies that—if prices were unchanged and stocks were valued by risk-neutral investors—the
probability that the stock price rises—the probability of state 1—is the following: 
(b2) .
It is important to understand that this risk-neutral probability is not the objective probability that
the stock price will rise. It is a synthetic probability that the stock price will rise if actual prices had
been determined by risk-neutral agents.
No assumption in this example provides the objective probability that the stock price will rise;
neither can one calculate the expected return to the stock. But even without the objective probabilities,
one could calculate the option price through the assumption of the absence of arbitrage. It is counter-
intuitive but true that the expected return on the stock is not needed to value a call option. One might
think that a call option would depend positively on the expected return to the stock. But, because
one can value the option through the absence of arbitrage, the expected return to the stock doesn’t
explicitly appear in the option pricing formula.
And the risk-neutral probabilities can be used to calculate the value of the option ($C) by discount-
ing the value of the (risk-neutral) expected option payoff. Recalling that the option is worth $2 in the
first state of the world, which has a probability of 0.6282 and $0 in the second state of the world, the
option price can be calculated as the discounted risk-neutral expectation of its payoff as follows: 
.
This calculation provides the same answer as the no-arbitrage argument used in Figure 1. In some
cases, it is easier to derive option pricing formulas from a risk-neutral valuation. 
The concept of risk-neutral valuation implies that IV from option prices measures the volatility
of the risk-neutral probability measure. To the extent that an asset price’s actual stochastic process
differs from a risk-neutral process, perhaps because there is a risk-premium in its drift or a volatil-
ity risk premium in the option price, the information obtained by inverting option pricing formulas
will be misleading. The true distribution of the underlying asset price is often called the objective
probability measure.













pp e ? ?   $() $ $. 12 1 8 10 0 05 +− =For overlapping horizons, the residuals in (8)
will be autocorrelated and, while ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimates are still consistent, the
autocorrelation must be dealt with in construct-
ing standard errors (Jorion, 1995). Such data sets
are described as “telescoping” because correlation
between adjacent errors declines linearly and then
jumps up at the point at which contracts are
spliced. 
Table 2 shows the results of estimating (8)
with σIV,t,T and σRV,t,T on three-month eurodollar
futures. β ˆ
1 is statistically significantly less than
1—0.83—indicating that IV is an overly volatile
predictor of subsequent RV. This is the usual
finding from such regressions: See Canina and
Figlewski (1993), Lamoureux and Lastrapes
(1993), Jorion (1995), Fleming (1998), Christensen
and Prabhala (1998), and Szakmary et al. (2003),
for example. As discussed previously, there are
many potential explanations for this conditional
bias—sample selection, overlapping data, errors
in IV—but the most popular story is that stochas-
tic volatility introduces risk to delta hedging,
making writing options risky.
Figure 5 shows a scatterplot of {IV, RV} pairs
along with the OLS fitted values from Table 2, a
45-degree line and the mean of IV and RV. If IV
were an unbiased predictor of RV, the 45-degree
line would be the true relation between them.
The fact that the OLS line is flatter than the 45-
degree line illustrates that IV is an overly volatile
predictor of RV. The cross in Figure 5—which is
centered on {mean IV, mean RV}—lies beneath
the 45-degree line, illustrating that the mean IV
is higher than mean RV. 
What Does IV Illustrate About
Uncertainty About Future Interest Rates?
Comparing Figure 3 with Figure 4 shows that
IV has been declining with the overall level of
short-term interest rates, which have been falling
with inflation since the early 1980s. One interpre-
tation of the data is that the sharp rise in inflation
in the 1970s and the subsequent disinflation of
the 1980s created much uncertainty about the
level of future interest rates, which has gradually
fallen over the past 20 years. The reduction in
uncertainty with respect to interest rates probably
Neely
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Figure 3
Federal Funds Targets and Three-Month
Eurodollar Rates
NOTE: The figure displays federal funds targets and the three-
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Figure 4
Realized and Implied Volatility on 
Three-Month Eurodollar Rates
NOTE: The figure displays three-month eurodollar IV and RV
from March 20, 1985, through June 29, 2001.stems from both a reduction in the level of interest
rates and greater certainty about both monetary
policy and the level of real economic activity. 
A close look at Figure 4 also hints that there
might be some seasonal pattern in IV, associated
with the expiry of contracts. Indeed, long-horizon
IVs tend to be larger than short-horizon IVs (which,
for brevity, are not shown). As IV is scaled to be
interpretable as an annual measure, comparable
at any horizon, this is a bit of a mystery. It might
simply be an artifact of the simplifying assump-
tions of the BS model. 
What Sort of News Is Coincident with
Changes in IV?
Events of obvious economic importance and
large changes in the futures price, itself, often
accompany the largest changes in IV. To examine
news events around large changes, the Wall Street
Journal business section was searched for news
on the dates of large changes and on the days
immediately following those changes—from
March 20, 1985, through June 29, 2001. Table 3
shows some of the largest changes in IV during
the sample and the event that might have precip-
itated it. 
The largest change in IV, by far, is a rise of
1.2 percentage points on October 20, 1987, coin-
ciding with the stock market crash of 1987, when
the S&P 500 lost 22 percent of its value in one
day. Four more of the top 20 changes (including
the second largest) happened in the six weeks
following the crash and one happened eight weeks
before the crash, on August 27, 1987. The large
changes in the IV of three-month eurodollar inter-
est rates reflected uncertainty about future interest
rates prior to the crash. A change in Federal
Reserve Chairmen might have fueled the apparent
uncertainty about the economy and the stance of
monetary policy. Alan Greenspan took office as
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve on August 11, 1987.
The third largest change, a 0.44-percentage-
point increase, occurred on November 28, 1990.
It coincided with reports that President George
H.W. Bush would go to Congress to ask for endorse-
ment of plans to use military force to evict Iraqi
forces from Kuwait. The possibility of war in such
an economically important area of the world
clearly spooked financial markets. 
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Table 2










NOTE: The table shows the results of predicting three-month
eurodollar RV with IV, as in (8). The rows show α ˆ, its robust
standard error, β ˆ
1, its robust standard error, the Wald test
statistic for the null that {α, β} = {0, 1}, the Wald test p-value,
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Figure 5
Implied Volatility as a Predictor of Realized
Volatility
NOTE: The figure shows a scatterplot of {IV, RV} pairs along
with the ordinary least-squares fitted values from Table 2 (solid
black line), a 45-degree line (short dashes) and the IV and RV
(cross). The data are in percentage terms.Neely
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Table 3
News Events Coincident with Large Changes in Three-Month Eurodollar IV 
∆ in federal 
Rank ∆ in IV Date funds target? Relevant financial news
1 1.182 10/20/87 No Stock market crash of 1987: S&P 500 declined 22 percent in one day. 
2 –0.526 11/12/87 No Decline in U.S. trade deficit.
3 0.438 11/28/90 No Gulf War fears: Bush going to Congress to ask for authority to evict
Iraq from Kuwait.
4 0.411 8/27/98 No Russian debt crisis: Yeltsin may resign, along with an indefinite 
suspension of ruble trading and fear Russia may return to Soviet-
style economics.
5 –0.375 1/15/88 No The sharp narrowing of the trade deficit triggered market rallies.
6 0.353 12/2/96 No Retailers reported stronger-than-expected sales over Thanksgiving. 
7 0.339 10/15/87 No Stocks and bonds slid further as Treasury Secretary Baker tried to 
calm the markets, saying the rise in interest rates isn’t justified. 
8 0.332 9/3/85 No The farm credit system is seeking a federal bailout of its $74 billion 
loan portfolio…As much as 15 percent of its loans are 
uncollectible. 
9 0.330 11/27/87 No Inflation worries remain despite the stock crash, due to higher 
commodity prices and the weak dollar. 
10 –0.321 10/29/87 Yes Post-stock market crash reduction in the federal funds target.
11 0.315 6/7/85 No Bond prices declined for the first time in a week, as investors awaited
a report today on May employment…The Fed reported a surge 
in the money supply, leaving it well above the target range. 
12 –0.302 10/30/87 No Stocks and bonds reversed course after an early slide, helped by 
G-7 interest-rate drops.
13 –0.301 8/16/94 Yes FOMC meeting: The Fed boosted the funds rate 50 basis points, 
sending a clear inflation-fighting message.
14 –0.298 7/11/86 Yes The Fed’s discount-rate cut prompted major banks to lower their 
prime rates. 
15 –0.285 12/2/91 No Under strong pressure to resuscitate the economy, President 
George H.W. Bush promised not to do “anything dumb”to 
stimulate the economy. 
16 0.279 4/20/89 No Financial markets were roiled by a surprise half-point boost in 
West German interest rates. The tightening was quickly matched 
by other central banks. 
17 0.278 8/27/91 No Federal funds target rate was increased on August 6 and 
September 13, 1991.
18 0.275 8/31/89 No Federal funds target rate was increased on August 20 and October 18,
1989.
19 0.275 8/27/87 Yes Federal funds target rate raised by 12.5 basis points.
20 0.266 6/2/86 No Bond prices tumbled amid concern the economy will speed up, 
renewing inflation. 
NOTE: The table contains the largest changes in IV (in percentage points, in descending order) and the news (as reported in the Wall
Street Journal) that was associated with those changes. The sample includes changes from March 20, 1985, through June 29, 2001.Another large increase, of 0.41 percentage
points, occurred on August 28, 1998. This rise was
coincident with the Russian debt crisis, rumors
that President Yeltsin had resigned, and the pos-
sibility of a reversal of Russian political and
economic reforms. The Russian debt crisis had
potentially serious implications for international
investors. Neely (2004c) discusses the episode
and its potential effect on U.S. financial markets.
Several of the 20 largest changes in three-
month eurodollar IV were also associated with
large changes in the futures price. It is likely that
these changes in the futures price were unantici-
pated because large, anticipated changes in futures
prices provide profit-making opportunities.
Additionally, anticipated changes are unlikely to
cause a substantial revision to IV. Four of the 20
largest changes in IV were also associated with
presumably unanticipated changes in the federal
funds target rate. It seems that unanticipated
monetary policy can be an important determinant
of uncertainty about future interest rates.
Finally, one might note that the large IV
changes shown in Table 3 refute the BS assump-
tions of a constant or even continuous volatility
process. As such, they might be partly responsible
for delta hedging errors, which require a risk
premium that causes IV to be a conditionally
biased estimate of RV.
CONCLUSION
This article has explained the concept of IV
and applied it to measure uncertainty about
three-month eurodollar rates. The IVs associated
with three-month eurodollars can be interpreted
to reflect uncertainty about the Federal Reserve’s
primary monetary policy instrument, the federal
funds target rate. 
As with IV in most financial markets, the IV
of the three-month eurodollar rate has been an
overly volatile predictor of RV. IV on the three-
month eurodollar rates has been declining since
1985, as inflation and interest rates have fallen
and the Fed has gained credibility with financial
markets. The largest changes in IV were coincident
with important economic events such as the stock-
market crash of 1987, fears of war in the Persian
Gulf, and the Russian debt crisis. Most of the rest
of the largest changes in IV have similarly been
associated with important news about the real
economy or the stock market or revisions to
expected monetary policy. 
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A European option is an asset that confers the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell an underlying
asset for a given price, called a strike price, at the expiry of the option. 
An American option can be exercised on or before the expiry date.1
Call options confer the right to buy the underlying asset; put options confer the right to sell the
underlying asset. 
If the underlying asset price is greater (less) than the strike price, a call (put) option is said to be in the
money. If the underlying asset price is less (greater) than the strike price, the call (put) option is
out of the money. When the underlying asset price is near (at) the strike price, the option is near
(at) the money. 
The firm or individual who sells an option is said to write the option. 
The price of an option is often known as the option premium. 
1 The terms European and American no longer have any geographic meaning when referring to options. That is, both types of options are
traded worldwide. 
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